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TORTS 
WHITE v. SAMSUNG ELECTRONICS 
AMERICA, INC.: THE WHEELS OF JUSTICE 
TAKE AN UNFORTUNATE TURN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Ninth Circuit's decision in White v. Samsung Electron-
ics America, Inc./ greatly 'expands the protection afforded to an 
individual's right of publicity under California common law2 and 
Federal statutory law.s In White, the Ninth Circuit held that an 
advertisement depicting a robot dressed in a wig, gown and jew-
elry, while posed next to a game board," did not bear a sufficient 
likeness to Plaintiff Vanna White to constitute an appropriation 
of her identity under California Civil Code section 3344.11 How-
ever, the court ruled that this same advertisement may be a vio-
lation of White's common law right of publicity.s The court re-
manded the case so that the issue could be submitted to a jury.7 
Similarly, the court remanded White's claim under section 43(a) 
of the Lanltam Act,8 ruling that White had raised a genuine is-
sue of material fact concerning a likelihood of confusion as to 
1. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992) (per 
Goodwin, J., with whom Pregerson, J., joined; Alarcon, J., concurring in part, dissenting 
in part), petition for reh'g en bane denied, 1993 U.S. App. LEX IS 4928 (9th Cir. March 
18, 1993). 
2. See 5 BERNARD E. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts §§ 587,588 (9th 
ed. 1988) [hereinafter WITKIN] for a discussion of the common law right of publicity in 
California. 
3. Lanham Act § 43(a), 15 V.S.C.A. § 1125(a) (West 1982). 
4. White, 971 F.2d at 1396. 
5. See infra note 75 for the relevant text of CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1992) . 
. 6. See WITKIN, supra note 2, §§ 587, 588. 
7. White, 971 F.2d at 1402. 
8. See infra note 99 for the text of section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 
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1
Hyland and Lindquist: Torts
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
300 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:299 
her endorsement of Defendant Samsung's products.9 
II. FACTS 
In 1988, Samsung Electronics America, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Samsung")1o ran a series of advertisements in approximately 
six publications.ll The circulation of these publications was 
widespread, even national in some instances. I2 The advertise-
ments, created by David Deutsch Associates, Inc. (hereinafter 
"Deutsch"}/3 all employed a similar theme: a Samsung product 
purchased today will still be operating in the twenty-first cen-
tury.I4 The advertisements created a humorous effect by por-
traying outrageous future outcomes involving cultural items 
popular at the time the advertisements were published. IIi 
One of these advertisements, promoting Samsung video-cas-
sette recorders (VCRs), was the impetus to this action. I6 The ad-
vertisement pictured a robot, dressed in a wig, gown and jewelry 
and was designed by Deutsch to resemble Vanna White. I7 The 
robot is positioned in front of a game board distinctly resem-
bling the one used on the "Wheel of Fortune" game show. I8 The 
9. White, 971 F.2d at 1401. 
10. Samsung Electronics America, Inc. is a manufacturer of various electronic prod-
ucts, including televisions, stereos, and video cassette recorders. 
11. White v. Samsung Electronics America, 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992), pe-
tition for reh'g en bane denied, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 4928 (9th Cir. March 18, 1993). 
12.Id. 
13. Id. David Deutsch Associates, Inc. is an advertising agency incorporated in New 
York. Id. at 1395. Deutsch was also named a defendant in this action. 
14.Id. 
15. White, 971 F.2d at 1396. One ad depicted a raw steak with the caption: "Re-
vealed to be health food. 2010 A.D." Another pictured controversial television show host 
Morton Downey Jr. in front of an American flag with the caption: "Presidential candi-
date. 2008 A.D." Id. 
16.Id. 
17. Id. Defendants do not contest that the robot was styled to resemble Vanna 
White and, in fact, referred to the ad as the "Vanna White ad." Id. at 1399. 
18. White, 971 F.2d at 1396. The "Wheel of Fortune" gameshow set includes a large 
board composed of a number of blocks. These blocks are blank on one side and inscribed 
with a letter of the alphabet on the other side. When all of the blocks are turned around, 
a word or phrase is revealed. The contestants on the show take turns guessing which 
letters are included in the word or phrase. When a contestant guesses correctly the corre-
sponding block designating that letter is turned around. Eventually, enough of the letters 
are revealed to enable a contestant to guess what the word or phrase spells. The winning 
contestant receives prizes and/or money. Vanna White's primary duty on the show is to 
turn the blocks to reveal a letter upon a correct guess by one of the contestants. 
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robot is set in a stance for which Vanna White is famous. I9 Ac-
companying this picture is a caption reading: "Longest-running 
game show. 2012 A.D."20 
After this advertisement was published, Vanna White, who 
did not consent to the publication or receive any payment for 
it,21 brought an action against Samsung and Deutsch in the 
United States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia.22 The action alleged a violation of: (1) California Civil Code 
§ 3344;23 (2) California common law right of publicity;24 and (3) 
Lanham Act § 43(a).211 The district court granted summary judg-
ment against White on each of her three claims.26 White ap-
pealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth 
Circuit.27 
III. BACKGROUND 
Vanna White alleged that Samsung had "attempted to capi-
talize on [her] fame to enhance their fortune."28 The three areas 
of law under which she brought this action are each concerned 
with the commercial interest Vanna White retains in her iden-
tity as a celebrity.29 Section 3344 of the California Civil Code 
19. [d. The advertisement depicted the robot in the process of turning one block 
around to reveal a letter. Because turning the letter blocks is Vanna White's primary 
duty on the "Wheel of Fortune," this is a position in which she would be seen many 
times throughout the course of the show. 
20. [d. Below the picture of the robot on the game show set and its accompanying 
caption was a close-up picture of the control panel of a VCR and the Samsung product 
insignia. The caption under this picture was: "The VCR you'll tape it on. 2012 A.D. 
Samsung. The future of electronics." 
21. [d. 
22. Case number CV-88-06499-RSWL. The Honorable Ronald S.W. Lew, Judge. 
23. See infra notes 75-86 and accompanying text for a discussion of CAL. CIV. CODE 
§ 3344. 
24. See infra notes 32-73 and accompanying text for a discussion of the California 
common law right of publicity. 
25. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(a). See infra notes 86-107 and accompanying text for a dis-
cussion of Lanham Act § 43(a) .. 
26. White, 971 F.2d at 1396-97. 
27. [d. at 1396. 
28. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1396 (9th Cir. 1992), 
petition for reh'g en bane denied, 1993 U.S. App. 4928 (9th Cir. March 18, 1993). 
29. In White the court recognized the publicity value of a celebrity's identity: 
Television and other media create marketable celebrity iden-
tity value. Considerable energy and ingenuity are expended 'by 
those who have achieved celebrity value to exploit it for profit. 
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and the common law right of publicity each concern the result-
ing invasion of an individual's privacy,30 as well as the individ-
ual's right to control the comme~cial value of her identity.31 The 
Lanham Act § 43(a) addresses the false representation aspect 
and its ensuing effect on trade and fair competition. 
A. CALIFORNIA COMMON LAW 
1. The Right of Publicity: Born in Privacy 
Following the publication of The Right of Privacy by Sa-
muel Warren and Louis Brandeis,32 the individual right of pri-
Id. at 1399. 
The law protects the celebrity's sole right to exploit this value 
whether the celebrity has achieved her fame out of rare abil-
ity, dumb luck, or a combination thereof. 
30. The unauthorized appropriation of an individual's name or likeness for commer-' 
cial benefit was recognized by Professor Prosser as one of the four distinct types of inva-
sion of privacy. William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 CAL. L. REV. 383, 401-07 (1960) [herein-
after Prosser]. See also WITKIN, supra note 2, §§ 587-591 (discussing California Civil 
Code § 3344 as a statutory action for invasion of privacy). 
31. See Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP, PROBS. 
203, 203-04 (1954). ' 
The distinction between an appropriation which constitutes an invasion of privacy 
and one which is a "taking" of the commercial value of one's identity is best illustrated 
. by the manner in which damages are calculated. As McCarthy summarized: 
The appropriation type of invasion of privacy, like all privacy 
rights, centers on damage to human dignity. Damages are usu-
ally measured by "mental distress" - some bruising of the 
human psyche. On the other hand, the right of publicity re-
lates to commercial damage to the business value of human 
identity. Put simplistically, while infringement of the right of 
publicity looks to an injury. to the pocketbook, an invasion of 
appropriation privacy looks to an injury to the psyche. 
2 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 28.01[3] 
(3rd. ed. 1992) [hereinafter MCCARTHY). 
Moreover, while the right of publicity has emerged as an independent property 
right, see infra notes 35-38 and accompanying text, it is possible that an appropriation 
may be both an invasion of privacy and an invasion of a commercial interest. This will 
most likely occur where the plaintiff is a celebrity, and therefore her identity has some 
commercial value, and the particular means of appropriation cause some damage to the 
plaintiff's dignity. So, while the right of publicity is an independent right, it retains some 
connection to the right of privacy. Therefore, because § 3344 and the common law are 
not restricted to either mental distress damages or commercial damages, they may be 
regarded as protecting both privacy and property rights. 
32. Samuel D. Warren and Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARV. L. 
REV. 193 (1890). Warren and Brandeis reviewed cases recognizing what amounted to a 
right of privacy but which were explained by courts using various tort, property or con-
tractual applications. The authors concluded that what these courts were in effect pro-
4
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vacy gradually gained recognition. This right of privacy is com-
prised of four distinct types of invasions.33 It is the fourth type, 
appropriation of an individual's name or likeness for commercial 
benefit, which is commonly known as the right of publicity.34 
Since 1953,36 the right of publicity, while originally viewed 
as one type of invasion of privacy,S6 has grown into "an indepen-
dent legal right with its own distinct characteristics."s7 Today, 
tecting was an individual's "right to be let alone." [d. at 195. 
33. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). The Restatement adopted 
the four-part division advanced by Professor Prosser. See, Prosser, supra note 30, at 401-
07. The four types of invasion of privacy are: 
1. Intrusion upon the plaintiffs seclusion, solitude, or private affairs. 
2. Public disclosure of embarrassing private facts about the plaintiff. 
3. Publicity which places the plaintiff in a false light in the public eye. 
4. Appropriation for commercial benefit of the plaintiffs name or likeness. 
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977). 
34. The term "right of publicity" apparently was first coined in 1953 by Judge 
Frank. See MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 28.01[2)[b]. It was Judge Frank in Haelan Lab., 
Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 
(1953), who stated: 
[d. at 868. 
We think that, in addition to and independent of that right of 
privacy (which in New York derives from statute), a man has 
a right in the publicity value of his pp.otographs, i.e., the right 
to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his picture, and 
that such a grant may validly be made 'in gross', i.e., without 
an accompanying transfer of a business' or anything else. . . . 
This right might be called a 'right of publicity.' 
Though it was Judge Frank who seemingly first used the term "right of publicity," 
the idea that this right exists as an independent property right distinct from the right of 
privacy was advanced twelve years earlier in a dissenting opinion by Judge Holmes in 
O'Brien v. Pabst Sales Co., 124 F.2d 167 (5th Cir. 1941) (Holmes, J., dissenting), cert. 
denied, 315 U.S. 823 (1942). Holmes observed: 
[d. at 170. 
The right of privacy is distinct from the right to use one's 
name or picture for purposes of commercial advertisements. 
The latter is a property right that belongs to everyone; it may 
have much or little, or only a nominal, value; but it is a per-
sonal right, which may not be violated with impunity. 
35. See generally Haelan Laboratories, supra note 34. 
36. See supra note 33 and accompanying text. 
37. See MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 28.01[3]. McCarthy states: 
While there has been much confusion generated by the seman-
tic distinction between "privacy" and "publicity," the courts 
have now come to recognize that the two rights are clearly sep-
arable and rest on quite different legal policies: the right to 
privacy protects against intrusion upon an individual's private 
self-esteem and dignity, while the right of publicity protects 
against commercial loss caused by appropriation of an individ-
ual's personality for commercial exploitation. 
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this right exists under the common law of fifteen states. S8 
2. The Right of Publicity in California: How Broad the Scope? . 
California first recognized the right of publicity in 1955. In 
Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. CO.,S9 the defendant, a 
manufacturer of photocopy machines, circulated40 an advertise-
ment containing a list of lawyers and law firms currently using a 
particular model of photocopy machine manufactured by the de-
fendant. 41 The plaintiff was an attorney who, prior to circulation 
of the advertisement, had purchased one of the photocopy ma-
chines but who had returned it to the defendant in order to re-
ceive a refund.·2 The advertisement contained plaintiff's name 
as one of the lawyers using the photocopy machine.·s In ruling 
that the plaintiff was entitled to bring an action for invasion of 
his privacy," the court noted that "[t]he exploitation of an-
other's personality for commercial purposes constitutes one of 
the most flagrant and common means of invasion of privacy.""i 
The unauthorized use of an individual's photograph for 
commercial purposes is also well recognized as a basis for liabil-
ity in an action for invasion of privacy.'6 In Eastwood v. Supe-
rior Court,'7 well-known actor Clint Eastwood brought an action 
against The National Enquirer, a weekly newspaper, for the un-
[d. See also Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977) (recogniz-
ing that the right of publicity is "an entirely different tort" than invasion of privacy). 
38. See MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 28.04(1). These states are: California, Connecti-
cut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, New Jersey, Ohio, 
Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, and Wisconsin. Four of these states also have statutes which 
encompass the right of publicity: California, Florida, Texas, and Wisconsin. [d. Nine 
other states have statutes which include most aspects of the right of publicity: Kentucky, 
Massachusetts, Nebraska, Nevada, New York, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and 
Virginia. [d. 
39. 291 P.2d 194 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App. 1955). 
40. "About 30,000 copies of the advertisement were circulated in major cities 
throughout the United States." [d. at 196. 
41. [d. The advertisement was meant to convey a list of satisfied customers using 
the "Apeco Systematic Auto-Stat." 
42. [d. 
43. The advertisement also contained the location of the attorney's practice. The 
plaintiff was the only Los Angeles lawyer listed. [d. 
44. Fairfield, 291 P.2d at 197-98. 
45. [d. at 197. 
46. See WITKIN, supra note 2, at 685. 
47. 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
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authorized use of. his photograph.48 The Enquirer published49 a 
story about "Eastwood's romantic involvement with two other 
celebrities, singer Tanya Tucker and actress Sondra Locke. The 
pictures of Eastwood and Tucker appeared on the cover of this 
edition above the caption 'Clint Eastwood in Love Triangle with 
Tanya Tucker.' "00 The court ruled that The Enquirer had used 
Eastwood's photograph and name in order to gain a commercial 
. advantage over its competitors.o1 Therefore, "Eastwood ha[ d] 
sufficiently alleged that The Enquirer ha[d] commercially ex-
ploited his name, photograph, and likeness under both the com-
mon law and section 3344, subdivision (a)."02 The court ordered 
the respondent court to set aside its order sustaining the demur-
rer to Eastwood's second cause of action without leave to 
amend.os 
The unauthorized use of an individual's voice is also action-
able as an invasion of one's right of publicity. In Midler u. Ford 
Motor CO.,04 the Ninth Circuit ruled that Bette Midler, a well 
known professional singer and actress, could bring an action 
under the common law against the defendant for using a 
"sound-alike"oo singer in a television commercial advertising de-
fendant's automobiles. After Midler refused an offer to sing one 
of her most popular songs06 in the commercial, Ford Motor 
Company and its advertising agency07 hired Ula Hedwig, a for-
mer backup singer for Bette Midler, to sing the song and in-
structed her to imitate Midler to the best of her ability.06 The 
48. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 344·45. The first cause of action alleged that The 
Enquirer had invaded Eastwood's privacy by placing him in a false light. The second 
cause of action, similar to White, alleged an invasion of privacy through the commercial 
appropriation of his photograph, name, and likeness under both the common law and 
California Civil Code § 3344. 
49. The 600·word article appeared in the April 13, 1982 edition. [d. at 344. 
50. [d. at 345. 
51. [d. at 349. 
52. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 349. The court refused to recognize an exemption 
from liability under California Civil Code § 3344(d) which exempts a use of a name, 
photograph, or likeness in connection with the reporting of news. [d. at 349·52. 
53. The court issued a peremptory writ of mandamus. [d. at 352. 
54. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). 
55. [d. at 463. 
56. The song which the defendants had asked Bette Midler to sing was entitled, "Do 
You Want To Dance" from Midler's 1973 album, "The Divine Miss M." ld. at 461. 
57. Young & Rubicam, Inc. was hired in 1985 by Ford Motor Company to develop 
this particular advertising campaign for the Ford Lincoln Mercury. [d. 
58.ld. 
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court held "that when a distinctive voice of a professional singer 
is widely known and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a 
product, the sellers have appropriated what is not theirs and 
have committed a tort in California. "119 
Finally, there may be an invasion of one's right to publicity 
where an individual's likeness is appropriated. In Mot-
schenbacher u. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco CO.,60 the Ninth Circuit6l 
ruled that there may be an appropriation even though the de-
fendant had used neither the name, photograph, likeness, or 
voice of the plaintiff.62 Here, the defendant68 produced and 
broadcast a television commercial depicting racing cars on a 
racetrack.64 The race car pictured in the foreground was very 
similar to the one driven by Plaintiff Motschenbacher.611 After 
the commercial was broadcast nationally,66 Motschenbacher 
brought an action67 alleging "misappropriation of his name, like-
59. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. The court also stated that "[t]o impersonate her voice is 
to pirate her identity." Id. 
60. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). 
61. Here, jurisdiction was based on diversity. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit applied 
the common law as it believed the California courts would. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 
823 (following Erie R.R. Co.v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938)). Although the case was 
tried in Federal court, Motschenbacher represents an application of the California com-
mon law right of publicity. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 823. 
62. See id. at 822. 
63. R.J. Reynolds is a tobacco company which produces Winston brand cigarettes. 
See id. The William Esty Company is an advertising agency which was also named a 
defendant in this action. See id. 
64.Id. 
65. Id. Motschenbacher was at the time a "professional driver of racing cars, inter-
nationally known and recognized in racing circles and by racing fans." Id. Since 1966, he 
had "consistently 'individualized' " his cars to set them apart from those of other drivers 
and to make them more readily identifiable as his own. Id. The defendants made slight 
alterations to the photograph of the racing cars, inCluding: 
Id. 
66.Id. 
they changed the numbers on all racing cars depicted, trans-
forming plaintiff's number "11" into "71"; they "attached" a 
wing-like device known as a "spoiler" to plaintiff's car; they 
added the word "Winston," the name of their product, to that 
spoiler and removed advertisements for other products from 
the spoilers of other cars. However, they made no other 
changes, and the white pinstriping, the oval medallion [these 
were the distinguishing marks of plaintiff's car], and the red 
color of plaintiff's car were retained. 
67. The action was filed in the United States District Court for the Central District 
of California. Id. at 822. 
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ness, personality, and endorsement .... "68 The district court 
granted summary judgment for the defendants noting that the 
driver of the car in the advertisement was not recognizable and 
therefore could not reasonably be understood to be Mot-
schenbacher.69 The Ninth Circuit concluded that an individual's 
proprietary interest in his identity should be afforded legal pro-
tection.70 . The court agreed that the plaintiff's likeness was not 
recognizable.71 However, the court found that the distinguishing 
features of the car made it possible for a reasonable inference to 
be drawn that it was in fact plaintiff in the car.n 
Thus, under California common law there may be an inva-
sion of one's right to publicity by appropriation of his or her 
name, photograph, voice or likeness. The plaintiff must estab-
lish: (1) the defendant's use of the plaintiff's identity; (2) the 
appropriation of plaintiff's name or likeness to defendant's ad-
vantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent by plain-
tiff; (4) resulting injury.73 
68. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 822. 
69. ld. at 822-23. The court first characterized plaintiff's action as an invasion of 
privacy action. ld. at 822. The court then found as a matter of law that: 
The driver of car No. 71 in the commercial (which was plain-
tiff's car No. 11 prior to said change of number and design) is 
anonymous; that is, (a) the person who is driving said car is 
unrecognizable and unidentified, and (b) a reasonable infer-
ence could not be drawn that he is, or could reasonably be 
understood to be plaintiff, Lothar Motschenbacher, or any 
other driver or person. 
ld. at 822-23. 
70. ld. at 825. The Ninth Circuit first discussed the dual theories under which 
courts have protected an individual's interest in his own identity: a privacy theory or a 
"right of publicity" property theory. ld. The court then decided that it did not need to 
distinguish between the two theories and that it only needed to determine whether Cali-
fornia courts would recognize such an interest and protect it. ld. at 826. 
71. Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 827. 
72. ld. The court stated: 
[Tlhe court's ... conclusion of law to the effect that the driver 
is not identifiable as plaintiff is erroneous in that it wholly 
fails to attribute proper significance to the distinctive decora-
tions appearing on the car. As pointed out earlier, these mark-
ings were not only peculiar to the plaintiff's cars but they 
caused some persons to think the car in question was plain-
tiff's and to infer that the person driving the car was the 
plaintiff. 
ld. The court vacated the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the 
defendants and remanded the case for further proceedings. ld. 
73. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (citing WILLIAM L. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS pp. 
804-07 (4th ed. 1971». 
9
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B. CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE § 3344 
The California statute was passed in 1971 prohibiting the 
unauthorized use of a person's name, photograph, or likeness.7• 
In 1984, the statute was amended to extend the protection to 
include use of one's voice or signature.711 
While there is disagreement as to whether section 3344 of 
the Civil Code codifies or complements the common law right of 
privacy,78 both the statute and the common law protect the 
same right.77 However, in order to prevail under the statute the 
plaintiff must show that the appropriation was intentional. 78 In 
contrast, proof of intent is not required under the common law.79 
74. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1992) (added Stat. 1971 ch. 1595, § 1). 
75. The portions of California Civil Code § 3344 pertinent to this article provide: 
(a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, sig-
nature, photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in prod-
ucts, merchandise, or goods, or for purposes of advertising or 
selling, or soliciting purchases of, products, merchandise, 
goods or services, without such person's prior consent, or, in 
the case of a minor, the prior consent of his parent or legal 
guardian, shall be liable for any damages sustained by the per-
son or persons injured as a result thereof. . . . 
(b) As used in this section, "photograph" means any photo-
graph or photographic reproduction, still or moving, or any 
videotape or live television transmission, of any person, such 
that the person is readily identifiable. 
(1) A person shall be deemed to be readily identifiable from a 
photograph when one who views the photograph with the na-
ked eye can reasonably determine that the person depicted in 
the photograph is the same person who is complaining of its 
unauthorized use. 
(g) The remedies provided for in this section are cumulative 
and shall be in addition to any others provided for by law. 
CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344 (West 1992) (amended Stat. 1984 ch. 1704, § 2). 
76. In Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 346, the court stated that "the fourth category of 
invasion of privacy, namely, appropriation, 'has been complemented legislatively by Civil 
Code section 3344 ... .' " (citing Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425, 428 n.6 (Cal. 
1979». 
But see WITKIN, supra note 2, at 687, stating "C. C. 3344 ... codified a person's 
right to recover damages for the knowing use of his 'name, photograph, or likeness.''' 
(emphasis added). 
77. Compare CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (West 1992) with notes 32-73 and accompa-
nying text. Both the statute and the common law right of publicity protect against ap-
propriations of a person's name, photograph, voice, or likeness. 
78. "Any person who knowingly uses .... " CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a) (emphasis 
added). 
79. See Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 291 P.2d 194 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
10
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Additionally, plaintiff must show a "direct" connection between 
the unauthorized use and the commercial purpose.80 
In Midler v. Ford Motor CO.,8t the Ninth Circuit ruled that 
Bette Midler was not entitled to bring an action under section 
3344(a) because the voice used in the commercial was not her 
voice.82 The Court also held that the "term 'likeness' refers to a 
visual image not a vocal imitation."83 
The interpretation of section 3344(a) by the courts in Mid-
ler and Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc. 84 demon-
strates the narrow applicability of the statute.811 
C. THE LANHAM ACT § 43(a) 
The Lanham Act86 was enacted m 1946 m an attempt to 
App. 1955). There the court stated: 
Id. at 197. 
The motives of a person charged with invading the right are 
not material with respect to the determination whether there 
is a right of action, and malice is not an essential element of a 
violation of the right .... Inadvertence or mistake is no de-
fense where the publication does in fact refer to the plaintiff 
in such manner as to violate his right of privacy. 
80. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 347 (following Johnson v. Harcourt, Brace, Jova-
novich, Inc., 118 Cal. Rptr. 370 (Cal. Ct. App. 1974». In Johnson, the defendant had 
published a college textbook containing a reprint of an article about plaintiff's finding a 
large sum of money and turning in the money. Id. at 372-73. The court held that defend-
ant's use of the article was not a violation of § 3344(a) because it was not included pri-
marily for purposes of selling the textbook. Id. at 381. "[T)he article was not a primary 
reason for the textbook; nor was it a substantial factor in the students' purchases of the 
books." Id. 
81. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. 
82. Midler, 849 F.2d at 463. 
83.Id. 
84. See supra note 80. 
85. The Johnson court refused to read the phrase "for purposes of advertising or 
selling, or soliciting purchases ... " from § 3344 broadly so as to encompass use in a 
college textbook. Johnson, 43 Cal. App. 3d at 895. The Midler court read both "voice" 
and "likeness" narrowly in denying the applicability of Bette Midler's claim. Midler, 849 
F.2d at 463. 
86. 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1051-1127 (West 1982). The 1946 Trademark Act, more com-
monly known as the Lanham Act, derives its name from Representative Fritz Garland 
Lanham, a Democratic representative from Texas who was a member of Congress from 
1919 to 1947. As chairman of the House Committee on Patents, Congressman Lanham 
was given the draft of a trademark statute developed by Edward S. Rogers, a member of 
the American Bar Association Committee appointed to investigate alternatives to trade-
mark legislation existing in the 1930's. Congressman Lanham introduced the draft as 
11
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create a general federal law of unfair competition.8? Three fac-
tors provided the greatest catalyst for the creation of this gen-
eral federal law of unfair competition. First, as a result of the 
1938 Supreme Court decision in Erie Railroad Co. v. 
Tompkins,88 the existing body of federal substantive law, includ-
ing the body of law pertaining to unfair competition, lost its sig-
nificance.89 The net result of the Erie decision was to create as 
many bodies of unfair competition law as there were states.90 In 
passing the Lanham Act, Congress could provide for a nationally 
uniform unfair competition law, notwithstanding the holding of 
Erie.91 
Second, passage of the Lanham Act was necessary if the 
United States was going to recognize its obligations as a signa-
tory to the Inter-American Convention of 1929.92 United States 
companies doing business in foreign countries found it difficult 
to secure protection from unfair trade practices due to the fail-
ure of the United States to carry out, through legislation, its in-
ternational treaty obligations.98 
Third, the Lanham Act served as a response to the restric-
tive holding of American Washboard Co. v. Saginaw Manufac-
turing CO.9. American Washboard established the doctrine that 
in actions involving misrepresentations about goods, only claims 
against "palming off"9G were actionable.98 Because the Inter-
H.R. 9041 on January 19, 1938. After many years of hearings and compromise, the Lan-
ham Act was finally signed into law by President Truman on July 5, 1946, and took 
effect one year later, July 5, 1947. See MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 5.04. 
87. MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 27.02(1). 
88. 304 U.S. 64 (1938) (holding that there is no federal general common law). 
89. Walter J. Derenberg, Federal Unfair Competition Law at the End of the First 
Decade of the Lanham Act: Prologue or Epilogue?, 32 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1029, 1030 (1957) 
[hereinafter Derenberg); see also, MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 27.02(1). 
90. Derenberg, supra note 89, at 1030. 
91. See id. 
92. See id. As a signatory to the Inter-American Convention of 1929, the United 
States obligated itself to provide effective legal protection against many different forms 
of unfair practices in international trade. Id. 
93. S. Rep. No. 1333, 79th Congress, 2d Sess. (1946), reprinted in 1946 U.S.C. Congo 
Servo 1274, 1276. 
94. 103 F.2d 281 (6th Cir. 1900); see also Paul E. Pompeo, Note, To Tell The Truth: 
Comparative Advertising And The Lanham Act Section 43(a), 36 CATH. U. L. REV. 565, 
570 (1987) [hereinafter Pompeo). 
95. "Palming off" occurs when the defendant sells his goods as those of the plaintiff; 
e.g., the manufacturer imitates another's trademark, trade name, product appearance, or 
packaging, leading consumers to purchase Y's goods in the belief that they are actually 
12
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American Trademark Convention of 1929 required relief beyond 
such claims as "palming off" in cases of unfair competition; the 
restrictive holding of American Washboard was contrary to the 
United States' obligations on the internationalleve1.97 Thus, the 
United States could meet its obligations under the Inter-Ameri-
can Trademark Convention by passing the Lanham Act and cre-
ating federal relief broader in scope than that of "palming off."98 
Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act99 was originally conceived 
as a means of easing the restrictive requirements of proof in the 
common law false advertising cases/oo which required proof of 
willfulness and an intent to deceive. 101 
X's. In American Washboard, the plaintiff, who was the nation's sole manufacturer of 
aluminum washboards, claimed deception since the defendant's zinc washboards were 
represented as being made of aluminum. The court concluded that deception alone could 
not raise a cause of action. The court held that "it is only where this deception induces 
the public to buy the goods as those of the complainant that a private right of action 
arises. " [d. at 284-85. 
96. [d. at 285; see also L'Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649, 651 
(3rd Cir. 1954) (holding that section 43(a) of the Lanham Act does not require claims of 
"palming off"). . 
97. See Derenberg, supra note 89, at 1037-38; see also Pompeo, supra note 94, at 
570. 
98. See Derenberg, supra note 89, at 1037-38; see also Pompeo, supra note 94, at 
570. 
99. Section 43(a) of the Lanhiun Act, 15 U.S.C.A § 1125(a) (West 1982), provides as 
follows: 
Any person who shall affix, apply, or annex, or use in connec-
tion with any goods or services, or any container or containers 
for goods, a false designation of origin, or any false description 
or representation, including words or other symbols tending 
falsely to describe or represent the same, and shall cause such 
goods or services to enter into commerce, and any person who 
shall with knowledge of the falsity of such designation of ori-
gin or description or representation cause or procure the same 
to be transported or used in commerce or deliver the same to 
any carrier to be transported or used, shall be liable to a civil 
action by any person doing business in the locality falsely in-
dicated as that of origin or the region in which said locality is 
situated, or by any person who believes that he is or is likely 
to be damaged by the use of any such false description or 
representation. . 
In 1988, § 43(a) was amended to its current version, 11 U.S.C.A. § 43(a) (West Supp. 
1992). This amendment, however, was enacted after White filed her complaint and is 
therefore not applicable to the Ninth Circuit's consideration of Vanna White's action. 
White, 971 F.2d at 1399 n.2. 
100. MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 27.02[1]. See also American Washboard Co., 103 
F.2d at 281. 
101. [d. Section 3 of the Act of March 19, 1920, ch. 104, 41 Stat. 533, which was 
13
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The true vehicle which the drafters envisioned guiding them 
to their destination of a "federal law of unfair competition" was 
actually section 44 of the Lanham Act. l02 Section 44108 contained 
the language, "protection against unfair competition," which im-
plied that a great deal of leeway would be afforded in the 
breadth with which protections against unfair competition 
would be available. This expansive vehicle, however, never mate-
rialized in section 44.104 
Although the language of section 43(a) is restrictive in re-
gard to its application/oil it has gradually expanded through ju-
dicial constructionl06 into the foremost federal vehicle for the as-
sertion of the two major and distinct types of unfair 
competition: (1) false advertising and (2) infringement of regis-
tered and unregistered marks, names and trade dress. l07 
IV. COURT'S ANALYSIS 
A. THE MAJORITY 
1. Section 3344: A Narrow Application 
In White v. Samsung Electronics America, [nc./08 the 
Ninth Circuit began its review of the district court'slOe entry of 
superseded by section 43(a) of the Lanham Act, required a showing of wilfulness and an 
intent to deceive. This proof of wilfulness made enforcement of section 3 practically im-
possible. Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 648 n.7 (3rd Cir. 
1958) (citing Parfumerie Roger et Gallet Societe Anonyme v. Godet, Inc., 17 Trade-Mark 
Rep. I, 2 (S.D. N.Y. 1926». 
102. MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 27.02[1]. 
103. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1126 (West 1982). 
104. See MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 27.02[1]. 
105. Because § 43(a) is limited to a prohibition against a "false description or repre-
sentation," it can never be a federal codification of the overall law of "unfair competi-
tion." MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 27.02[1]; Cf. Lanham Act § 44, which provides for 
"protection against unfair competition." See id. (emphasis added). 
106. The leading case which provided the impetus for the explosion of § 43(a) as a 
federal vehicle for protection against unfair competition was L' Aiglon Apparel, Inc. v. 
Lana Lobell, Inc., 214 F.2d 649 (3rd Cir. 1954). This explosion was due to the court in 
L'Aiglon Apparel completely breaking with common law precedents regarding false ad-
vertising and embracing section 43(a). Derenberg, supra note 89, at 1046. 
107. MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 27.02[1]. 
108. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir. 1992), pe-
tition for reh'g en banc denied, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 4928 (9th Cir. March 18, 1993). 
109. This action before the Ninth Circuit was an appeal from the United States 
District Court for the Central District of California. Ronald S.W. Lew, District Judge, 
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summary judgment in favor of the defendant by discussing 
Vanna White's claim under California Civil Code section 3344.110 
The court disagreed with White's contention that the "Samsung 
advertisement used her 'likeness' in contravention of section 
3344."111 The Ninth Circuit in White again applied a narrow in-
terpretation of the statute as it did in Midler u. Ford Motor 
Co.1l2 The court noted that it previously rejected Bette Midler's 
section 3344 claim113 because the statutory prohibition against 
appropriation of an individual's voice was limited to actual re-
cordings of the plaintiff's voice and did not include "vocal imita-
tion."1l4 Similarly, the section 3344 prohibition against appropri-
ation of "likeness" is limited to a visual "image."m Relying on 
Midler, the court again adopted a narrow application of section 
3344. 
, 
Applying this narrow standard, the court held that the 
robot used by Samsung in the advertisement was not a "like-
ness" within the meaning of section 3344.116 Thus, the court af-
firmed the district court's dismissal of White's section 3344 
claimY7 
Presiding. Argued and submitted June 7, 1991 in Pasadena California. 
110. White, 971 F.2d at 1397. 
111. [d. 
112. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 82·84 and accompanying text. 
113. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. 
114. See White, 971 F.2d at 1397 (quoting Midler, 849 F.2d at 463). 
115. White, 971 F.2d at 1397. 
116. [d. The court stated: 
In this case, Samsung and Deutsch used a robot with mechani-
cal features, and not, for example, a manikin molded to 
White's precise features. Without deciding for all purposes 
when a caricature or impressionistic resemblance might be-
come a 'likeness,' we agree with the district court that the 
robot at issue here was not White's 'likeness' within the mean-
ing of section 3344. 
[d. From this statement it is difficult to determine what the meaning of "likeness" is for 
purposes of the statute. It can only be determined that this particular robot in the Sam-
sung advertisement was not a "likeness." By applying the statute narrowly, the court has 
aligned itself with its previous decisions and the decisions of the California courts. How-
ever, it has reserved itself an avenue by which a broader application of the statute, even 
under similar circumstances, might be embraced. 
117. [d. 
15
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2. The Common Law: Beyond "Name" or "Likeness" 
The court began its analysis of White's common law right of 
publicity claiml18 with a discussion of the four elements of the 
right of publicity claim as stated in Eastwood v. Superior 
Court.U9 While the court agreed with the district court that 
Samsung's use of the robot was not an appropriation of White's 
"name or likeness,"12o it did not believe the common law right of 
publicity was so confined. l21 Rather, it held that because East-
wood involved the appropriation of Clint Eastwood's name and 
photograph,122 that court did not have "occasion to consider the 
extent beyond the use of name or likeness to which the right of 
publicity reaches."123 The court stated that appropriation of 
"name or likeness" is not a required element of the right of pub-
licity, but only a species of cases in which the cause of action 
had been recognized.124 
In recognizing that the right of publicity is not limited to an 
appropriation of "name or likeness,"1211 the court relied on Pros-
ser's article Privacy.126 In Privacy, Prosser contended that there 
may be an appropriation of one's identity without the use of his 
name or likeness.127 From this the court draws support for its 
conclusion that the common law covers means of appropriation 
beyond those specified in section 3344.128 
The court then discussed Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds 
118. White, 971 F.2d at 1397. 
119. 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). See supra note 73. 
120. White, 971 F.2d at 1397. Therefore Vanna White had not established the sec-
ond prong of the Eastwood test. [d. 
121. [d. 
122. See supra notes 46-53 and accompanying text. 
123. White, 971 F.2d at 1397. The court stated that: "[The Eastwood court) held 
only that the right of publicity 'may be' pleaded by alleging, inter alia, appropriation of 
name or likeness, not that the action may be pleaded only in those terms." [d. 
124. [d. 
125. [d . 
. 126. [d. at 1397-98; see also generally Prosser, supra note 30. 
127. See Prosser, supra note 30, at 401 n.155. Prosser states: "It is not impossible 
that there might be appropriation of the plaintiff's identity, as by impersonation, with-
out the use of either his name or his likeness, and that this would be an invasion of his 
right of privacy." [d. 
128. See supra note 75. Section 3344 includes appropriations of name, voice, signa-
ture, photograph, or likeness. 
16
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Tobacco Co.,m as a case in which the Ninth Circuit extended 
the protection afforded an individual by the common law right 
of publicity beyond appropriation of "mi.me or likeness."lSO 
From Motschenbacher, the court adopted the proposition that 
the common law protects against appropriations of one's "iden-
tity."lSl The court drew further backing for this proposition 
. from Midler v. Ford Motor CO./S2 wherein the Ninth Circuit 
ruled that Bette Midler had stated a claim because the defend-
ants had appropriated her identity. ISS 
The court's final illustration is found in a decision of the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit. In Carson 
v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc./ S4 the Sixth Circuit 
ruled that defendant corporation, which rented and sold porta-
ble toilets, had appropriated appellant Johnny Carson'sl86 right 
of publicity in naming its products "Here's Johnny Portable 
Toilets."lss The Carson court stated that "[i]f the celebrity's 
identity is commercially exploited, there has been an invasion of 
his right whether or not his- 'name or likeness' is used."ls7 
The Ninth Circuit then concluded that Motschenbacher, 
Midler, and Carson demonstrated that the common law right of 
publicity reaches beyond appropriation of "name or likeness."ls8 
129. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text. 
130. See White, 971 F.2d at 1398. 
131. See id. 
132. 849 F.2d 460. 
133. Id. The court stated: 
In Midler, this court held that, even though the defendants 
had not used Midler's name or likeness, Midler had stated a 
claim for violation of her California common law right of pub-
licity because "the defendants ... for their own profit in sell-
ing their product did appropriate part of her identity" by us-
ing a Midler sound-alike. 
Id. (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1988)). 
134. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). 
135. Johnny Carson was the host and star of "The Tonight Show," a well-known 
television program broadcast five nights a week by the NBC television network. Id. at 
832. Each night on the show he was introduced by a drawn-out pronunciation of the 
phrase "Here's Johnny." Id. 
136. Id. at 834-37. 
137. Id. at 835. In disagreeing with the district court's dismissal of Carson's right of 
publicity claim, the court noted that its "conception of tl;1e right of publicity is too nar-
row." Id. In White, the Ninth Circuit cites this ruling in its discussion of the broad 
protection afforded by the common law right of publicity. White, 971 F.2d at 1398. 
138. [d. The court stated: 
17
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From here the court began its analysis of the facts presented in 
Vanna White's case.1S9 
First, the court reiterated its interpretation of the common 
law right of publicity as protecting against more than merely a 
"laundry list" of express means of appropriating identity.140 The 
court believed this interpretation was necessary in order to en-
sure the effectiveness and viability of the right of publicity.141 
According to the court, the "laundry list" will no longer be com-
posed of particular means in which one's identity may be appro-
priated but rather will protect against all appropriations of one's 
identity. 142 
The court did not attempt to define or describe the reaches 




These cases teach not only that the common law right of pub-
licity reaches means of appropriation other than name or like-
ness, but that the specific means of appropriation are relevant 
only for determining whether the defendant has in fact appro-
priated the plaintiff's identity. The right of publicity does not 
require that appropriations of identity be accomplished 
through particular means to be actionable. 
140. White, 971 F.2d at 1398-99. 
141. Id. The court stated: 
A rule which says that the right of publicity can be infringed 
only through the use of nine different methods of appropriat-
ing identity merely challenges the clever advertising strategist 
to come up with the tenth .... Indeed, if we treated the means 
of appropriation as dispositive in our analysis of the right of 
publicity, we would not only weaken the right but effectively 
eviscerate it. The right would fail to protect those plaintiffs 
most in need of its protection. 
142. See id. This appears to be the direction in which the Ninth Circuit is advanc-
ing the common law right of publicity as seen in the court's elimination of the require-
ment that the plaintiff show a particular means of appropriation; i.e., name or likeness. 
Id. 
143. See id. at 1399. The court does imply that the attributes by which a celebrity is 
recognized are likely to fall under the umbrella of "identity": 
Id. 
The more popular the celebrity, the greater the .number of 
people who recognize her, and the greater the visibility for the 
product. The identities of the most popular celebrities are not 
only the most attractive for advertisers, but also the easiest to 
evoke without resorting to obvious means such as name, like-
ness, or voice. 
18
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gests that the appropriate test is whether the defendant has 
used a significant combination of attributes identifiable as be-
longing to the plaintiff and through which the plaintiff is 
recognizable. 144 
The court then applied this test to the Samsung advertise-
ment. 1411 Initially, it noted that the individual aspects of the ad-
vertisement say little.146 However, the court emphasized that 
when viewed as a whole, "they leave little doubt about the celeb-
rity the ad is meant to depict."l47 Also significant, noted the 
court, is the fact that the defendants themselves referred to the 
advertisement as the "Vanna White ad. "148 
In concluding its discussion of Vanna White's claim under 
the common law right of publicity, the court summarized the 
need to protect a celebrity's marketable identity.H9 The court 
144. This test is implicitly derived from a hypothetical presented by the court: 
Consider a hypothetical advertisement which depicts a 
mechanical robot with male features, an African-American 
complexion, and a bald head. The robot is wearing black 
hightop Air Jordan basketball sneakers, and a red basketball 
uniform with black trim, baggy shorts, and the number 23 
(though not revealing "Bulls" or "Jordan" lettering). The ad 
depicts the robot dunking a basketball one-handed, stiff-
armed, legs extended like open scissors, and tongue hanging 
out. Now envision that this ad is run on television during pro-
fessional basketball games. Considered individually, the 
robot's physical attributes, its dress, and its stance tell us lit-
tle. Taken together, they lead to the only conclusion that any 
sports viewer who has registered a discernible pulse in the last 
five years would reach: the ad is about Michael Jordan. 




147. [d. The court's description of the advertisement noted that: 
148. [d. 
149. [d. 
The female-shaped robot is wearing a long gown, blond wig, 
and large jewelry. Vanna White dresses exactly like this at 
times, but so do many other women. The robot is in the pro-
cess of turning a block letter on a game-board. Vanna white 
dresses like this while turning letters on a game-board but 
perhaps similarly attired Scrabble-playing women do this as 
well. The robot is standing on what looks to be the Wheel of 
Fortune game show set. Vanna White dresses like this, turns 
letters, and does this on the Wheel of Fortune game show. She 
is the only one. 
19
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viewed the argument advanced by Samsung, i.e. that there was 
no appropriation because Samsung did not use Vanna White's 
name or likeness, as one which would eviscerate the common law 
right of publicity and the Ninth Circuit therefore held that the 
district court erred in granting summary judgment against 
Vanna White for her common law claim.l!!O 
3. Lanham Act § 43(a): Likelihood of Confusion? 
The Ninth Circuit next addressed the district court's deter-
mination of White's claim under section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act. m In order to prevail on her Lanham Act claim, the court 
noted that White must show that Samsung, in running the robot 
ad, created a likelihood of confusion as to whether White was 
endorsing Samsung's VCRs. m 
While the Ninth Circuit has recognized several different 
multi-factor tests for determining whether a likelihood of confu-
sion exists,1!!3 the court pointed out that none of them are cor-
rect to the exclusion of the others.}!!4 Since the court reviews ap-
peals from summary judgment de novo, and because the district 
court apparently did not utilize any test in granting Samsung's 
summary judgment motion, m the court chose to apply the 
eight-factor test enumerated in AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft.Boats. 1!!6 
150. White, 971 F.2d at 1399. 
151. See supra notes 86-107 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 'legisla-
tive history of Lanham Act § 43(a). 
152. White, 971 F.2d at 1399. 
153. See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979) (apply-
ing eight-factor test); J.B. Williams Co. v. Le Conte Cosmetics, Inc., 523 F.2d 187, 191 
(9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 424 U.S. 913 (1976) (applying six-factor test); Rodeo Collec-
tion, Ltd. v. West Seventh, 812 F.2d 1215, 1217 (9th Cir. 1987) (applying five-factor test). 
154. White, 971 F.2d at 1399. Each multi-factor test was applied not as an exclusive 
list of requirements for determining' the existence of a likelihood of confusion, but rather 
was meant to provide a list of factors from which the district court might more easily 
make its ultimate determination. See Eclipse Associates Ltd. V. Data General Corp., 894 
F.2d 1114, 1118 (1990). 
155. See White, 971 F.2d at 1400. 
156. 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979). The relevant factors for consideration, as 
stated in AMF, are as follows: 
(1) the strength of the plaintiff's mark; 
(2) relatedness of the goods; 
(3) similarity of the marks; 
(4) evidence of actual confusion; 
(5) marketing channels used; 
20
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In determining the strength of the plaintiff's mark, the 
court began by defining the terms "mark" and "strength" such 
that they would apply to cases involving confusion over endorse-
ment by a celebrity plaintiff. In such cases, the court pointed out 
that "mark" means the celebrity's persona,1II7 while the 
"strength" of the mark refers to the level of recognition the ce-
lebrity enjoys among members of society.11l8 The court stated: 
"[i]f Vanna White is unknown to the segment of the public at 
whom Samsung's robot ad was directed, then that segment could 
not be confused as to whether she was endorsing Samsung 
VCRs.m Il9 However, because of White's extreme familiarity to 
the general public, the court held that White's mark, or "celeb-
rity identity," is strong.160 
The court applied the second factor, the relatedness of the 
goods, by defining the term "goods," in cases involving confusion 
over celebrity endorsement, to mean "the reasons for or source 
of the plaintiff's fame."16l Since Vanna White had attained her 
fame through the medium of television, and since the ad's pre-
mise was that Samsung VCRs would be taping the "longest-run-
ning game show" well into the future, the court found that 
White's goods are closely related to Samsung's VCRs.162 
In consideration of the third factor, the similarity of the 
marks, the court determined that it both supports and contra-
dicts a finding of likelihood of confusion.163 While the court 
stated that, "[o]n the one hand, all of the aspects of the robot ad 
identify White; on the other, the figure is quite clearly a robot, 
not a human."164 Due to this ambiguity, the court concluded 
that the remaining AMF factors must be considered to deter-
(6) likely degree of purchaser care; 
(7) defendant's intent in selecting the mark; 
(8) likelihood of expansion of the product lines. 
157. White, 971 F.2d at 1400 (citing Allen v. National Video, Inc., 610 F. Supp. 612 
(D.C.N.Y. 1985». 
158. [d. (citing Academy of Motion Picture Arts v. Creative House, 944 F.2d 1446, 
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mine whether a likelihood of confusion existed. I611 
Because she did not present any evidence of actual confu-
sion, the court found that the fourth factor, whether there is any 
evidence of actual confusion, did not favor White's claim.I66 
Applying the fifth factor, or the marketing channels used, 
the court determined that it favored White because she had ap-
peared in many magazines in the same stance that the robot was 
depicted in the ad in question, and it was magazines which were 
used as the marketing channel for the robot ad. I67 
As to the sixth factor, the likely degree of purchaser care, 
the court simply stated that "[c]onsumers are not likely to be 
particularly careful in determining who endorses VCRs, making 
confusion as to their endorsement more likely."168 
Perhaps finding the seventh factor, the defendant's intent 
in selecting the mark, more important than the other AMF fac-
tors, the court analyzed the defendant's intent in much more de-
tail than any other factor. While noting that the district court 
had found that the defendants had intended the ad as a spoof of 
the "Wheel of Fortune" game show/89 the court stated that 
"[t]he relevant question is whether the defendants 'intended to 
profit by confusing consumers' concerning the endorsement of 
Samsung VCRs."170 
In determining the intent of the defendants, the court 
looked to the series of advertisements as a whole and found that 
a "[j]ury could reasonably conclude that beneath the surface hu-
mor of the series lay an intent to persuade consumers" that 
Vanna White was endorsing Samsung VCRS.l7l 
165. [d. 
166. White, 971 F.2d at 1400. 
167. [d. 
168. [d. 
169. [d. at 1400-01. The court did not disagree with the district court that the de-
fendants intended to spoof Vanna White and "Wheel of Fortune." Rather, the court 
found that intending to spoof Vanna White does not preclude the possibility that de-
fendants also intended to confuse consumers regarding White's endorsement of Samsung 
VCRs. 
170. [d. at 1400 (quoting Toho Co. Ltd. v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788 (9th 
Cir. 1981». 
171. White, 971 F.2d at 1401. 
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To support its conclusion, the court compared two ads: the 
robot ad and an ad involving Morton Downey Jr.172 Since Mor-
ton Downey Jr. personally appeared in the ad, the court held 
that consumers would likely believe that Morton Downey Jr. was 
paid to appear in the ad and was endorsing Samsung prod-
uctS.173 The court concluded that the series of ads, when taken 
as a whole, could leave consumers with the impression that ce-
lebrity Vanna White, like celebrity Morton Downey Jr., was en-
dorsing Samsung products,174 therefore showing that Samsung 
intended to profit from such confusion. 1711 
Finally, the court dismissed the eighth factor, the likelihood 
of expansion of the product lines, as not being appropriate for 
consideration in a celebrity endorsement case such as this.l76 
Considering its application of each of the AMF factors to 
the facts of this case, the court held that the district court erred 
in granting summary judgment against Vanna White as to her 
Lanham Act claim.177 
B. THE DISSENT 
Judge Alarcorn, while concurring with the court's resolution 
of section 3344 of the California Civil Code, dissented from the 
court's analysis of White's claims under both the common law 
right of publicity and Lanham Act § 43(a).178 
172. [d. The Morton Downey Jr. ad depicted Mr. Downey as a presidential candi-
date in the year 2008. 
173. See id. The court acknowledged that the Morton Downey Jr. ad was clearly 
intended as a spoof of presidential elections and Morton Downey Jr. 
174. [d. at 1400-0l. 
175. See id. 
176. [d. at 140l. 
177. [d. The court emphasized, however, the following two points: 
First, construing the motion papers in White's favor, as we 
must, we hold only that White has raised a ge.nuine issue of 
material fact concerning a likelihood of confusion as to her en-
dorsement. Whether White's Lanham Act claim should suc-
ceed is a matter for the jury. Second, we stress that we reach 
this conclusion in light of the peculiar facts of this case. In 
particular, we note that the robot ad identifies White and was 
part of a series of ads in which other celebrities participated 
and were paid for their endorsement of Samsung's products. 
[d. (citations omitted). 
178. White, 971 F.2d at 1402. 
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1. Right of Publicity 
The dissent rejected the majority's conclusion that a plain-
tiff may recover damages where there is an appropriation of the 
plaintiff's "identity," pointing to the fact that no California 
court has recognized such a right.179 Moreover, the dissent found 
no evidence in the record to support the majority's holding that 
Vanna White's "identity" was appropriated.180 
The dissent emphasized that a cause of action for appropri-
ation of the right of publicity has always been limited to the 
requirement of proof of an appropriation of name or likeness. 181 
Indeed, the district court based its decision on Eastwood u. Su-
perior Court because there had been no use of a likeness.182 
The dissent focused on the intent of the California Legisla-
ture and the distinguishable facts of the cases relied upon by the 
majority to refute the majority's holding. The intent of the Cali-
fornia Legislature, Judge Alarcon pointed out, seemed to have 
implicitly precluded the result reached by the majority through 
the maxim, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius. 183 Section 3344 
of the California Civil Code originally protected against appro-
priations of name or likeness. After the Ninth Circuit's decision 
in Motschenbacher u. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco CO./84 however, 
the California Legislature amended section 3344 to where it now 
protects against appropriations of voice or signature, as well as 
appropriations of name or likeness.181! According to Judge Alar-
con, "[t]he clear implication from the fact that the California 
Legislature chose to add only voice and signature to the previ-
ously protected interests is that it wished to limit the cause of 
179. Id. 
180. Id. 
181. Id. (citing, inter alia, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979) 
(holding that an actor's right to exploit his name or likeness for value was personal to the 
actor and did not survive his death); Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Prods., 603 P.2d 454 
(Cal. 1979) (holding that the use of the name Rudolph Valentino in a fictional biography 
was not an appropriation); Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 
1983». 
182. White, 971 F.2d at 1402. 
183. Id. at 1403. The phrase indusio unius est exc/usio alterius means the inclusion 
of one is the exclusion of another. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 763 (6th ed. 1990); see infra 
note 222 and accompanying text. 
184. 4!;}8 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). 
185. White, 971 F.2d at 1403. 
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action to enumerated attributes."l88 
The dissent distinguished each of the federal cases relied 
upon by the majority, Motsenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco 
CO.,187 Midler v. Ford Motor CO.188 and Carson v. Here's Johnny 
Portable Toilets, Inc.,189 instructing that "[t]he proper interpre-
tation of Motsenbacher, Midler, and Carson is that where iden-
tifying characteristics unique to a plaintiff are the only informa-
tion as to the identity of the person appearing in an ad, a triable 
issue of fact has been raised as to whether his or her identity 
[h]as been appropriated."lso In the advertisement in dispute in 
White, the dissent pointed out that it is "patently clear" to any-
one viewing the ad that Vanna White was not being depicted. lSI 
In fact, "[n]o reasonable juror could confuse a metal robot with 
Vanna White."ls2 . 
Essential to a proper analysis of the facts of White, accord-
ing to the dissent, is a recognition of the distinction between a 
performer and the part he or she plays; a distinction between 
Vanna White, the person, and the role that she plays as the cur-
rent hostess on the "Wheel of Fortune" television gam~ show.1s3 
Once this distinction is realized, the dissent claimed, it is evi-
dent that because her role as hostess of "Wheel of Fortune" is 
not a part of her personal identity, there was no appropriation of 
her identity.1s4 
2. The Lanham Act 
Finally, the dissent rejected the majority opinion as ari in-
stance of applying the wrong legal standard. lSI! In order to suc-
186. Id. 
187. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). See supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Motschenbacher. 
188. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). See supra notes 112-117 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Midler. 
189. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 134-137 and accompanying text 
for a discussion of Carson. 




194. Id. at 1404-05. 
195. Id. 
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ceed on a claim for damages under section 43(a) of the Lanham 
Act, the dissent noted, contrary to the majority, that White 
must prove actual deception of the consuming public. ISS Since 
White offered no evidence of actual confusion, the dissent con-
cluded that the district court was correct in granting summary 
judgment on White's Lanham Act claim.Is7 
Nevertheless, the dissent considered the majority's applica-
tion of the eight-factor test enumerated in AMF, Inc. v. Sleek-
craft Boats. ISS Stating that the third factor, the similarity of the 
marks, is the most important factor, the dissent noted that the 
majority merely glossed over it. ISS While the majority pointed 
out that the common characteristics "identify" White, the dis-
sent recognized the requirement that the marks be compared in 
their entirety.200 Accordingly, the consideration must involve 
two entities: the robot on the one hand, and Vanna White on the 
other. Looked at this way, the dissent found that no one could 
reasonably confuse the twO.201 Support for this conclusion can be 
seen when attributes other than the hair, dress, physical propor-
tions and jewelry are compared. 
When a mark has certain "salient aspects," they are given 
greater weight due to their correspondingly greater impact upon 
the consumer.202 The dissent found that the face of Vanna 
White and the features of the robot are more important charac-
teristics than those considered by the majority.203 When these 
more important characteristics are compared, the dissent stated 
that "[i]t should be clear to anyone viewing the commercial ad-
vertisement that the crude features of the robot are very dissim-
ilar to Vanna White's attractive and human face. "204 
196. [d. at 1405 (citing Harper House, Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc., 889 F.2d 197, 
208 (9th Cir. 1989) (holding that a claim for damages under section 43(a) requires a 
showing that the defendant "actually deceived a significant portion of the consuming 
public")). 
197. White, 971 F.2d at 1406. 
198. [d. See supra notes 156-177 and accompanying text for a discussion of the 
AMF eight-factor test. 





204. White, 971 F.2d at 1406. 
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Absent any confusion on the part of the consuming public, 
there can be no claim for a Lanham Act violation.206 Therefore, 
because Vanna White failed to offer any evidence of actual de-
ception, and it is clear that no reasonable person could confuse 
the robot with Vanna White, the dissent concluded that the dis-
trict court was correct in granting Samsung's motion· for sum-
mary judgment.206 
V. CRITIQUE 
A. CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE SECTION 3344 
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Sam-
sung's use of the robot was not an appropriation of Vanna 
White's likeness.207 In doing so, the court interpreted section 
3344 narrowly and thereby aligned itself with previous decisions 
interpreting the statute.208 
B. CALIFORNIA COMMON LAW 
The reasoning of the Ninth Circuit in its decision to remand 
White's common law claim reveals a failure to recognize the sig-
nificant expansion of the common law which the court has al-
lowed. This expansion has been accomplished in two steps. Ini-
tially, the common law right was freed from the confines of the 
statutory provisions.209 Next, the court broadened the common 
law to such an extent that an individual may now bring an ac-
tion not only where the figure portrayed in the advertisement210 
205. [d. 
206. [d. at 1407. 
207. White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395, 1397 (9th Cir. 
1992), petition for reh'g en bane denied, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS (9th Cir. March 18, 
1993). 
208. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. 
209. See White, 971 F.2d at 1397-99. The court's determination that Samsung had 
not appropriated White's "likeness" under § 3344 would likewise have been determina-
tive of her common law claim if the court did not find that the common law provided 
broader protection. The court stated that it "agree[dj that the robot did not make use of 
White's name or likeness. However, the common law right of publicity is not so con-
fined." [d. at 1397. 
210. For purposes of this article, it will be assumed that the vehicle of appropriation 
was a television, radio, or print advertisement. It is, however, possible that the appropri-
ation might occur in a different medium. See, e.g., Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. 
Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (plaintiff's photograph used on the cover of a tabloid 
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is or may be the plaintiff,211 but even where the figure portrayed 
is clearly not the plaintiff. 
The court,· therefore, has cast loose from its mooring the 
common law right of publicity and has placed upon the jury the 
burden of ensuring that it does not drift too far. Moreover, the 
court has failed to provide any standard of guidance by which 
the jury's burden may be allayed. 
1. Does Section 3344 Place a Limit on the Scope of the 
Common Law Protection? 
The conclusion that the common law right of publicity af-
fords broader protection to a plaintiff than does section 3344 
marks the first point on which the court's augmentation of the 
right of publicity becomes questionable. This development be-
yond the statutory confines is not itself flawed for this issue is 
not firmly resolved.212 It is the degree of expansion which is 
problematic. 
In support of its conclusion that the right of publicity is not 
limited to appropriations of "name or likeness,"213 the court re-
lied upon Eastwood v. Superior Court.2H The court interpreted 
Eastwood as a denotation that the "name or likeness" formula-
tion is not an element of the right of publicity,2111 but rather "a 
description of the types of cases in which the cause of action had 
been recognized."216 Therefore, a cause of action under the com-
mon law is not restricted to the terms of section 3344 and may 
newspaper). See also Young v. Greneker Studios, 26 N.Y.S.2d 357 (1941) (manikins 
made in form, features, and likeness of plaintiff). 
211. See, e.g., Eastwood, supra notes 119-124 and accompanying text. In Eastwood, 
the defendant used an actual photograph of the plaintiff. Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 
345. See also Motschenbacher, supra notes 129-131 and accompanying text. In Mot-
schenbacher, the plaintiff was not clearly visible in the commercial. Motschenbacher, 
498 F.2d at 822. However, the similarity of the racing car depicted and the plaintiff's car 
could have reasonably led one to believe that it was in fact the plaintiff featured in the 
commercial. Id. at 827. 
212. See supra note 76. 
213. White, 971 F.2d at 1397. It is likely that the court also would find that the 
right of publicity extends beyond appropriations of voice, signature, or photograph. 
These means of appropriation are prohibited by section 3344(a). However, because these 
means were not at issue in White the court did not discuss them in its analysis. 
214. 198 Cal. Rptr. 342 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983). 
215. White, 971 F.2d at 1397. 
216. Id. 
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be pleaded in terms other than "name or likeness."217 
A contrary position is advanced by the dissent. In his dis-
senting opinion, Judge Alarcon took issue with the majority's 
ruling that the use of a likeness is not required under California 
common law.218 Judge Alarcon disagreed that a plaintiff need 
only show an appropriation of her "identity" to recover.219 The 
dissent found that the only difference between the common law 
and section 3344 is that section 3344 is limited to intentional220 
appropriations, whereas the common law protects against both 
intentional and unintentional appropriations.221 Judge Alarcon 
believed that this had been decided by the California Court of 
Appeal in Eastwood and therefore it was not an issue which the 
Ninth Circuit needed to resolve.222 Additionally, the dissent in-
ferred a legislative resolution to this issue from the 1988 amend-
217. Id. The majority stated that the Eastwood court "held only that the right of 
publicity cause of action 'may be' pleaded by alleging, inter alia, appropriation of name 
or likeness, not that the action may be pleaded only in those terms." Id. 
Id. 
218. White, 971 F.2d at 1402. 
219. Id. Judge Alarcon stated: 
According to the majority, recovery is authorized if there is an 
appropriation of one's "identity." I cannot find any holding of 
a California court that supports this conclusion .... All of the 
California cases that my research has disclosed hold that a 
cause of action for appropriation of the right to publicity re-
quires proof of the appropriation of a name or likeness. 
220. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344(a). "Any person who knowingly uses another's name .. 
. " Id. (emphasis added). 
Id. 
221. White, 971 F.2d at 1403. Judge Alarcon stated: 
[T)he majority has ignored the fact that the California Court 
of Appeal in Eastwood specifically addressed the differences 
between the common law right to publicity and the statutory 
cause of action codified in California Civil Code section 3344. 
The court explained that '[t)he differences between the com-
mon law and the statutory actions are: (1) Section 3344, subdi-
vision (a) requires knowing use whereas under case law, mis-
take and inadvertence are not a defense against commercial 
appropriation and (2) section 3344, subdivision (g) expressly 
provides that its remedies are cumulative and in addition to 
any provided by law.' Eastwood, 198 Cal.Rptr. at 346 n.6 (em-
phasis in original). The court did not include appropriations of 
identity by means other than name or likeness among its list 
of differences between the statute and the common law. 
222. White, 971 F.2d at 1403. Judge Alarcon viewed the majority's expansion of the 
right of publicity as an unsupported "attempt [by a federal court) to create new law for 
the state of California." Id. 
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ment to section 3344. Judge Alarcon noted that the California 
Legislature's amendment to the statute included appropriations 
of voice or signature thereby evidencing the intent of the Legis-
lature to "limit the cause of action to enumerated attributes."223 
Upon this, the dissent based its opposition to the majority's con-
clusion that the right of publicity provides broader protection 
than does section 3344. 
From the opposing conclusions reached by the majority and 
dissent it is clear that the relationship between section 3344 and 
the common law right of publicity is not firmly resolved. More-
over, the disagreement is not unique to the White court.224 So, 
Id. 
223. Id. Judge Alarcon stated: 
The interest of the California Legislature as expressed in Cali-
fornia Civil Code section 3344 appears to preclude the result 
reached by the majority. The original section 3344 protected 
only name or likeness. In 1984, ten years after our decision in 
Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company, 498 
F.2d 821 (9th Cir.1974) and 24 years after Prosser speculated 
about the future development of the law of the right of public-
ity, the California legislature amended the statute. California 
law now makes the use of someone's voice or signature, as well 
as name or likeness, actionable. Cal.Civ.Code sec. 2233(a) 
(Deering 1991 Supp.). Thus, California, after our decision in 
Motschenbacher specifically contemplated protection for in-
terests other than name or likeness, but did not include a 
cause of action for appropriation of another person's identity. 
The ancient maxim, inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, 
would appear to bar the majority's innovative extension of the 
right of publicity. The clear implication from the fact that the 
California Legislature chose to add only voice and signature to 
the previously protected interests is that it wished to limit the 
cause of action to enumerated attributes. 
Apparently, Judge Alarcon believed that the Legislature intended for the statute to 
provide a list of "enumerated attributes" which are protected by both section 3344 and 
the common law. This conclusion is inevitable if Judge Alarcon's discussion of the exclu-
sive nature of the statute is to have any bearing on the exclusivity of the common law. 
Otherwise, the exclusivity would apply only to interests protected by the statute and 
would have no bearing upon actions brought under the common law. Therefore, this 
would support the position of the majority rather than Judge Alarcon's position. 
224. The disagreement about whether California Civil Code § 3344 "codifies" or 
"complements" is evidenced by the conflicting discussions of the majority and dissenting 
opinion in White, in particular, the opposing interpretations of Eastwood. The difficulty 
lies in determining whether section 3344 codified the right of publicity; i.e., reduced the 
common law right to statutory language, and added the "knowing" element, or whether 
section 3344 complemented the right of publicity; i.e., provided an additional basis of 
recovery where the appropriation is intentional, and also fixed the amount of damages. 
The court in Lugosi v. Universal Pictures, 603 P.2d 425 (Cal. 1979), stated that the 
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while the majority's expansion of the right of publicity beyond 
the confines of section 3344's enumerated types of appropria-
tions is debatable, it is not necessarily defective. Rather, the 
weakness is found in the next step the court took in its analysis 
after espousing the more liberal view. It is with this second step 
that the court sets the right of publicity adrift. 
2. Determining Appropriation: What are the Limits? 
Having concluded that the common law right of publicity 
covers more than name or likeness, the court went further by 
eliminating the need to categorize the means of appropriation at 
all. After White, there need only be an appropriation of an indi-
vidual's identity.22& A plaintiff who brings a right of publicity 
action may be successful if she can show that the defendant has 
used some combination of attributes which are identifiable as 
belonging to the plaintiff. The court proposed that the identity 
test was necessary in order to protect celebrities from "clever 
advertising strategist[ s] "226 who would simply develop new 
methods of appropriating one's identity if the common law only 
prohibited specific means of appropriation.227 For the court, this 
was simply the natural progression of the right of publicity as 
anticipated by Prosser228 and illustrated in cases such as Mot-
schenbacher,229 Midler,2so and Carson.2S1 However, the court's 
discussion reveals that, as applied to the particular facts of 
White, its decision was not merely an inherent advancement of 
the law. 
right of publicity "has been complemented legislatively by Civil Code section 3344 .... " 
Id. at 428 n.6 (emphasis added). See also Eastwood v. Superior Court, 198 Cal. Rptr. 
342, 346 n.6 (Cal. Ct. App. 1983) (citing Lugosi and noting that section 3344 comple-
ments the common law right of publicity). But see WITKIN, supra note 2, at § 589, stat-
ing that section 3344 "codified a person's right to recover .... " Id. at 687 (emphasis 
added). 
The distinction is further distorted by the fact that although Eastwood states that 
section 3344 complements the common law, Judge Alarcon derives from that opinion the 
view that it codifies the common law. White, 971 F.2d at 1403. 
225. See supra note 142 and accompanying text. 
226. White, 971 F.2d at 1398. 
227. See supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
228. See supra notes 126-128 and accompanying text. 
229. See supra notes 60-72 and accompanying text. 
230. See supra notes 54-59 and accompanying text. 
231. See supra notes 134-137 and accompanying text. 
31
Hyland and Lindquist: Torts
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
330 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:299 
The court first discussed Motschenbacher v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco CO.232 as a case where the Ninth Circuit found that 
there might be an appropriation without the use of either name 
or likeness.233 The court then cited Midler v. Ford Motor CO.234 
as additional authority. The court's final basis of support was 
found in Carson v. Here's Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc. 23r. 
While these cases do lend support to the majority's conclu-
sion, they are wholly distinguishable in one important aspect. In 
each of these cases there is a reasonable basis for confusion. as to 
whether the plaintiff was in fact the individual associated with 
or identified with the product. As the dissent noted: 
[t]he common theme in these federal cases is that 
identifying characteristics unique to the plaintiffs 
were used in a context in which they were the 
only information as to the identity of the individ-
ual. The commercial advertisements in each case 
showed attributes of the plaintiff's identities 
which made it appear that the plaintiff was the 
person identified in the commercial. No effort was 
made to dispel the impression that the plaintiffs 
were the source of the personal attributes at issue. 
The commercials affirmatively represented that 
the plaintiffs were involved.238 
In contrast, in White the robot depicted in the advertisement 
clearly was not Vanna White.237 
Therefore, while Motschenbacher, Midler and Carson may 
fairly be read as protecting more than "name" or "likeness," 
these cases do not lend support to the majority's conclusion that 
there may be an appropriation even where the depiction com-
plained of is obviously not the plaintiff. To allow a plaintiff to 
bring an action where the defendant has appropriated neither 
the plaintiff's name or likeness may be simply an advancement 
of the common law. To allow this same action where the subject 
232. 498 F.2d 821 (9th Cir. 1974). 
233. White, 971 F.2d at 1398. 
234. 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988). 
235. 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983). See supra notes 134-137 and accompanying text. 
236. White, 971 F.2d at 1404. 
237. Judge Alarcon noted that "[ilt is patently clear to anyone viewing the commer-
cial advertisement that Vanna White was not being depicted. No reasonable juror could 
confuse a metal robot with Vanna White." [d. 
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in the advertisement is clearly not the plaintiff marks a signifi-
cant departure from the common law right of publicity. 
3. What Effect on the Common Law? 
By allowing Vanna. White to present her claims to a jury238 
the Ninth Circuit has opened the floodgates through which nu-
merous right of publicity claims may now flow. A plaintiff need 
not show that the defendant employed a particular means of ap-
propriation. She does not have to prove that the defendant used 
her voice, signature, likeness, photograph, or name.239 Under the 
identity test240 announced in White, the plaintiff only has to 
show that the defendant has used attributes or characteristics 
through which the plaintiff is recognizable. Moreover, the plain-
tiff will be permitted to proceed with the action even where rea-
sonable people viewing the advertisement would not mistake the 
portrayal as being the plaintiff. 
The troubling result is that in reaching its decision a jury is 
left with near complete discretion in concluding what constitutes 
an appropriation. The jury is not limited to certain types of ap-
propriations.241 Nor is the jury required to find that the appro-
priation which is the subject of the action is or could reasonably 
be mistaken for the plaintiff. In short, this allows a jury to find 
for the plaintiff where the advertisement does not identify the 
plaintiff but merely reminds one of her.242 The minimum stan-
238. [d. at 1402. The court cautioned that "we hold only that White has pleaded 
claims which can go to the jury for its decision." [d. 
239. See supra note 75. 
240. See supra note 144 and accompanying text. 
241. The majority's conclusion that the right of publicity protects against appropri-
ations of one's identity does not evidence a departure from either the common law or 
section 3344. The departure is found in the court's conclusion that one's identity may be 
appropriated by means other than name, likeness, photograph, voice, or signature. 
242. "[I]nfringement of the right of publicity is governed by the test of 'iden-
tifiability' of the plaintiff as a person .... [A]n infringement of one's right of publicity is 
triggered if a more than insignificant number of people identify the object person from 
the defendant's unpermitted commercial use." See MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 28.02[5]. 
When this test is applied to the Samsung advertisement, it becomes apparent that 
the right of publicity could not be triggered. The word identify means "to regard as 
identical." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1123 (1976). No reasonable 
person could regard the robot in the advertisement as identical to Vanna White. How-
ever, the court held that a jury could find that the right of publicity had been triggered. 
See supra note 212. It appears that for the Ninth Circuit in White, the right of publicity 
may be triggered if the defendant's unpermitted commercial use simply reminds people 
33
Hyland and Lindquist: Torts
Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 1993
332 GOLDEN GATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 23:299 
dard for identification has been reduced to the capability of re-
minding one of another individual. It is not difficult to imagine 
that a jury who has seen the plaintiff in the courtroom, had her 
identifying characteristics and attributes described to them, and 
is then asked to decide whether the advertisement identifies the 
plaintiff, will quite often find that it does.243 
In White, the court granted the jury great discretion in de-
termining what constitutes an appropriation of a person's iden-
tity. This degree of discretion will prove problematic for defend-
ants in right of publicity actions for nearly every advertisement 
will contain elements which might remind prospective jurors of 
some celebrity.244 In granting this discretion even where no rea-
sonable person could find that Vanna White was depicted in the 
Samsung advertisement, the court has cast loose the right and 
placed the burden of charting its course upon the jury, with very 
little guidance from the court. Without some limitations on the 
jury's discretion it will be very difficult to strike a fair balance 
between those with "celebrity identity value"241i and those who 
market and advertise products. 
of the plaintiff. See WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1920 (1976) (de-
fining remind as putting one in mind of something or causing to remember). 
243. This after-the-fact judgment of the advertisement by the jury is, of course, al-
ways a problem in a right of publicity action. However, the problem is greatly reduced if 
the jury is limited to finding that the advertisement appropriated a particular aspect of 
the plaintiff's identity; i.e. likeness, voice, name, photograph, or signature. Where the 
depiction in the advertisement is clearly not the plaintiff, the need for further restric-
tions on the jury's discretion arises. See infra notes 249-253 and accompanying text. 
244. While the court did not have to address the issue because Samsung acknowl-
'edged that the robot was purposefully styled to resemble Vanna White, the holding in 
White does not preclude the possibility that an action may be brought even where the 
resemblance is purely coincidental. The effect upon the creative processes of advertising 
departments and agencies will be dramatic. Those who develop and create the advertis-
ing campaigns will proceed with great caution when seeking to in some way invoke any 
celebrity image for fear that they may have appropriated someone's identity. Not only 
will they be prohibited from intentionally using a celebrity's identity b a manner similar 
to the Samsung advertisement, but considerable effort will have to be directed toward 
ensuring that there is no inadvertent appropriation. The likelihood of "accidental" ap-
propriation is not insignificant. As the court states, "[t)he identities of the most popular 
celebrities are not only the most attractive for advertisers, but also the easiest to evoke 
without resorting to obvious means such as name, likeness, or voice." White, 971 F.2d at 
1399, So, just as it is easy for one to intentionally evoke the' identity of a celebrity, it is 
likewise as easy to do so inadvertently. 
245. Id. 
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4. Striking a Balance 
In order to ensure that its expansion of the common law 
adequately protects both plaintiffs and defendants, the Ninth 
Circuit should have required that where it is clearly not the 
plaintiff depicted in the advertisement the plaintiff must prove 
an appearance of endorsement.246 This would allow plaintiffs 
such as Vanna White to bring a right of publicity action where 
the defendant has appropriated some aspect of her identity 
other than name, likeness, voice, photograph, or signature while 
also protecting the creative expression of advertisers and mar-
keters. Those creating advertisements would be free to evoke ce-
lebrity identities "without resorting to obvious means such as 
name, likeness, or voice"247 but only up until the point of using 
that which is of value in a celebrity's identity: the power to ex-
ploit the identity for profit through endorsement.u8 
Currently, there is no requirement that the plaintiff show 
that the appropriation bears an appearance of endorsement.249 
However, there are two justifications for this which do not apply 
to an appropriation like that in White. First, while the right of 
publicity has grown to become an independent right,250 it still 
remains closely related to the right of privacy.251 Where there is 
246. This requirement would be similar to the likelihood of confusion test applied 
with respect to Lanham Act § 43(a). See supra notes 156·176 and accompanying text. 
247. White, 971 F.2d at 1399. 
248. This endorsement value is the property which the right of publicity protects. 
"[T)he right of publicity protects against commercial loss caused by appropriation of an 
individual's personality for commercial exploitation." MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 
28.01[3). 
249. "California law has not imposed any requirement that the unauthorized use or 
publication of a person's name or picture be suggestive of an indorsement or association 
with the injured person .... [T)he appearance of an 'indorsement' is not the sine qua 
non of a claim for commercial appropriation." Eastwood, 198 Cal. Rptr. at 348. See also 
MCCARTHY, supra note 31, § 28.03[1): "The unpermitted use of a person's identity 
merely to draw attention to a product or advertisement infringes the right of publicity. 
There need be no false inference that plaintiff endorses or approves the product.~' 
250. See supra note 38. 
251. This is illustrated by the Ninth Circuit's discussion of the right of publicity in 
Motschenbacher. The court first recognized that injury sustained in an appropriation 
action "may be largely, or even wholly, of an economic or material nature." Mot· 
schenbacher, 498 F.2d at 824. After discussing the fact that some courts protect this 
right under a privacy theory and others under a property theory, the court noted that it 
was not necessary to decide under which of these theories the California courts would 
recognize the right. [d. at 825·26. It was only necessary for the court to determine that 
the California courts would protect the right. [d. 
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an appropriation in an advertisement though no appearance of 
an endorsement; there is still an injury to the person due to the 
invasion of her privacy. The absence of an endorsement does not 
mean that there is no resulting injury. For this reason it is not 
essential to the right of publicity that there be an appearance of 
an endorsement. 
A second reason is that endorsement may be implicit in ap-
propriations where the subject depicted in the advertisement is 
or could reasonably be mistaken for the plaintiff. A celebrity en-
dorsement does not necessarily have to take the form of the ce-
lebrity appearing in the advertisement and specifically proclaim-
ing that she endorses the product. The mere presence of a 
celebrity will often be sufficient to cause those viewing the ad-
vertisement to believe that the celebrity is lending her credibil-
ity2112 to the product and therefore recommends or uses the prod-
uct. Endorsement suggests credibility. The celebrity's presence 
in the advertisement suggests endorsement. Therefore, because 
endorsement is tacit in the very presence of the celebrity, it need 
not be proved. 
These justifications do not hold true where the advertise-
ment is one like that in White. Where it is clearly not the plain-
tiff in the advertisement, the right of publicity has completely 
separated from its invasion of privacy roots. The damages 
Vanna White sought had very little, if anything, to do with her 
suffering "humiliation, embarrassment, and outrage. "2118 There 
was not, nor could there be, any invasion of Vanna White's pri-
vacy because it was not her in the advertisement. And no rea-
sonable person would have thought it was. 
Vanna White sought damages entirely for the unauthorized 
use of her property; i.e. the endorsement value of her celebrity 
identity. Therefore, in order to prevail she should be required to 
The court's discussion suggests that the right of publicity retains elements of both 
privacy and property theories and that there is no need to categorize it as one or the 
other. 
252. "Spokespersons and endorsers are thought to build credibility. They are either 
celebrities we admire, experts we respect, or someone 'just like us' whose advice we 
might seek out." WILLIAM WELLS ET AL., ADVERTISING PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE 403 (2nd 
ed. 1992). 
253. See Motschenbacher, 498 F.2d at 824 (discussing the mental and subjective 
injuries resulting from -an appropriation). 
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show that Samsung did in fact u!?e her property. Her endorse-
ment was not implicit because she was not present in the adver-
tisement. The advertisement simply featured a robot styled to 
resemble her. 
A requirement that the jury find that Samsung's advertise-
ment suggested an endorsement by Vanna White would focus 
the jury's attention on whether there was an appropriation 
rather than whether the advertisement reminded the viewer of 
Vanna White. This would act as a check upon the expanded dis-
cretion of the jury and ensure that the right of publicity is not 
lost in a sea of reminders and vague similarities. 
C. THE LANHAM ACT 
The majority's analysis with regard to Vanna White's Lan-
ham Act claim attempted to determine whether a likelihood of 
confusion existed as a result of Samsung's portrayal of a robot 
dressed in a similar fashion to Vanna White.2M Its analysis, how-
ever, is misplaced and merely glosses over the relevant factors to 
be considered. 
The dissent emphasized that the majority utilized the wrong 
legal standard in passing on White's Lanham Act claim.21111 Cit-
ing Harper House Inc. v. Thomas Nelson, Inc.,2116 the dissent 
found that White must show actual deception in order to pre-
vail in an action for damages under Lanham Act § 43(a).2117 Inas-
much as Vanna White offered no evidence of actual confusion 
among the consuming public,2118 her Lanham Act claim must fail. 
254. See notes 17-20 and accompanying text for a description of the "Vanna White 
ad." 
255. White, 971 F.2d at 1405. 
256. 889 F.2d 197, 208 (9th Cir. 1989) (opinion by Goodwin, C.J.) (holding that Lan-
ham Act § 43(a) requires, inter alia, "that defendants' false and deceptive representa-
tions and advertisements actually deceived a significant portion of the consuming pub-
lic") (emphasis added). 
257. White, 971 F.2d at 1405. The Second, Third, Seventh and Tenth Circuits each 
have also held that proof of actual confusion is a prerequisite to a claim for damages 
under Lanham Act § 43(a). PPX Enterprises v. Audio Fidelity Enterprises, 818 F.2d 266, 
271 (2nd Cir. 1987); Parkway Baking Co. v. Freihofer Baking Co., 255 F.2d 641, 648 (3rd 
Cir. 1958); Hesmer Foods, 'Inc. v. Campbell Soup Co., 346 F.2d 356, 359 (7th Cir. 1965), 
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 839 (1965); Brunswick Corp. v. Spinit Reel Co., 832 F.2d 513, 525 
(10th Cir. 1987). 
258. White, 971 F.2d at 1400. 
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While the dissent was correct in concluding that the district 
court did not err in granting Samsung's summary judgment mo-
tion, a consideration of the majority's analysis of the factors 
enumerated in AMF, Inc. v. Sleek craft Boats21l9 results in a simi-
lar conclusion. 
The majority focused on the seventh AMF factor, the intent 
of the defendant in selecting the mark, in reaching its conclusion 
that a likelihood of confusion existed.260 This emphasis is mis-
placed, however, due to the apparent intention of the advertise-
ments as a whole. 
Samsung chose to develop a series of advertisements, each 
of which involved a popular cultural item of today which evolved 
into an outrageous, twenty-first century existence.261 The under-
lying theme of each of these advertisements was: a Samsung 
product purchased today would be in operation in the twenty-
first century. 
In the so-called "Vanna White ad," a robot was depicted in 
the role in which Vanna White has become famous. Certainly no 
one could believe that Samsung intended to suggest that Vanna 
White would still be the hostess of the "Wheel of Fortune" game 
show in the year 2012. Rather, the "Vanna White ad" was in-
tended to parody the way television will be in the twenty-first 
century;262 instead of a human being playing the role of hostess 
on the "longest-running game show," we will be watching a 
robot. 
The AMF factor which is dispositive to this case is, as the 
dissent points out, the third factor, or the similarity of the 
marks. The majority finds that this factor both favors and disfa-
259. See notes 156-177 and accompanying text for a discussion of the majority's 
analysis of the AMF eight-factor test. 
260. White, 97.1 F.2d at 1400. 
261. See id. at 1396. 
262. While the advertisement' has the effect of reminding consumers of Vanna 
White, it does not identify her. See note 241 for a discussion of the distinction between 
identify and remind. It is illustrative to note that Vanna White is not the only person to 
have been the hostess of "Wheel of Fortune." Indeed, for the first seven years of its 
existence, the hostess of "Wheel of Fortune" was Susan Stafford, who also has blonde 
hair. Appellees' Brief at 3, White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 
(9th Cir. 1992) (No. 90-55840). 
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vors Vanna White.283 While the majority states that all of the 
aspects of the robot ad identify Vanna White, it concedes that 
the figure in the ad is "quite clearly a robot, not a human."284 
This concession precludes the majority's statement that the ad 
identifies Vanna White. 
As stated in the dissent, where certain aspects of a mark 
create a greater impact in the consumer, such aspects are given 
greater weight.281i In the "Vanna White ad," it is the features of 
the robot's face which create the greatest impact. Upon looking 
at the advertisement, a consumer instantly recognizes that the 
figure in the ad, while playing a role which Vanna White has 
made famous, is clearly a robot. Thus, inasmuch as no reasona-
ble consumer could possibly confuse the robot as resembling 
Vanna White, a consideration of the third factor, or similarity of 
the marks, must be resolved in Samsung's favor. 
The Ninth Circuit has repeatedly held that where circum-
stances are such that no likelihood of confusion exists, there can 
be no violation of Lanham Act § 43(a).288 The majority has 
failed to recognize the difference between a likelihood of confu-
sion as to Vanna White's endorsement of Samsung's products, 
and the inevitable result of a robot appearing in a set similar to 
the "Wheel of Fortune" game show set: the robot merely re-
minds the consumer of Vanna White. While it is this reminder 
which makes the advertisement so amusing, the vast distinction 
between the robot and Vanna White precludes the determina-
tion that the consuming public was confused as to whether 
White endorsed Samsung's products.287 
263. White, 971 F.2d at 1400. 
264. [d. 
265. [d. at 1406 (citing Country Floors, Inc. v. Gepner, 930 F.2d" 1056 (3rd Cir. 1991) 
(holding that the word "Country" should be given greater weight in comparing the 
marks "Country Tiles" and "Country Floors"». 
266. White, 971 F.2d at 1406-07 (Alarcon, J., dissenting) (citing Toho Co., Ltd. v. 
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981) ("Bagzilla" garbage bags did not 
infringe "Godzilla" mark); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 
1978), cert. denied sub nom, O'Neill v. Walt Disney Prods., 439 U.S. 1132 (1979) ("Silly 
Sympathies" in adult cornie books did not infringe on Disney's "Silly Symphonies"». 
267. See White, 971 F.2d at 1406 (Alarcon, J., dissenting). 
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VI. CONCLUSION 
The effectiveness of the law is largely contingent upon its 
ability to adapt and advance as society changes. The necessity of 
progression in the law is not diminished by opposition to it. 
However, unchecked expansion may be as detrimental as an in-
ability to change. 
Thus, the Ninth Circuit's conclusion that the right of pub-
licity affords greater protection than does section 3344 of the 
California Civil Code is not flawed simply because it may be a 
break from the common law. The error lies in the court's failure 
to recognize the significant departure and to provide substantive 
guidelines to ensure that the right of publicity does ·not drift too 
far, too fast. As applied to the facts of White, the court's rea-
soning is troubling. The effects of its holding will prove even 
more so. 
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning with regard to White's Lan-
ham Act claim is similarly troubling. In failing to recognize the 
requirement of proof of actual confusion where damages are 
sought, the court has departed from the reasoning of several 
other Circuits. The net effect of such departure will be witnessed 
by the confusion that will inevitably result as the court's reason-
ing is relied upon as precedent. 
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